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EVIDENCE-NEw FEDERAL STANDARD

FOR ADMISSION OF SCIENTIFIC

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993).
EVIDENCE:

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the American legal system has faced mounting
pressure to resolve issues at the forefront of science and technology.'
DNA testing, for example, has come fresh from the frontiers of
the scientific laboratory to be presented as a relevant factor in the
most routine criminal cases. 2 Techniques involving the psychological
stress evaluator, posthypnotic testimony, voiceprint, child abuse syndrome, forward-looking infrared analysis, and battered wife syndrome are being offered as scientific evidence though they were
totally unheard of a few years ago.' Some of the pressure on the
courts stems from the growth in environmental and toxic tort litigation, which often involve large numbers of people and raise significant economic, social, and public policy concerns.4 As the pressure
has mounted, courts and legal scholars have struggled with divergent
views on what tests should be applied to determine the admissibility
of purportedly "scientific" evidence.
On June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its long-awaited decision in the case of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' in which the court ruled that the "Frye"
test no longer applies in federal courts. 6 The Frye test, a threshold
test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, required
that such evidence be based on techniques or methods that have
7
become generally accepted in the appropriate scientific community.

1. Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 3, Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102), available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Briefs File.
2. Id. The first admission of DNA evidence in the United States for identification of a criminal defendant was upheld in 1988 on appeal to a Florida state
court. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). By 1990, 38
states had admitted DNA evidence in 185 cases. L. Damon Whitmore, Note, The
Admissibility of DNA Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1411,
1411 (1993).
3. Roger S. Hanson, James Alphonzo Frye Is Sixty-Five Years Old; Should
He Retire?, 16 W. ST. U. L. Rnv., 357, 359 (1989).
4. Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 3, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102), available in LEXIS,
Grenfed Library, Briefs file.
5. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
6. Id. at 2793.
7. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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The Frye test had become the dominant standard for determining
the admissibility of scientific evidence in the seventy years since it
was first articulated in 1923.8 In place of the Frye test, the Supreme
Court directed federal trial court judges to make preliminary assessments to determine whether proffered scientific evidence or testimony is relevant, reliable, and not unduly prejudicial or confusing. 9
II.

FACTS

The petitioners in Daubert were two minors and their parents. 0
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were born with limb-reduction birth
defects." During pregnancy the mothers of Jason and Eric had taken
Bendectin, a prescription drug manufactured by respondent Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' 2 and used for the treatment of nausea
and vomiting. 3 The petitioners brought suit,' 4 alleging that the ingestion of Bendectin by the mothers during pregnancy caused the
birth defects. 5 The petitioners offered the opinion testimony of eight
experts to establish that Bendectin use caused limb-reduction birth
defects.' 6 The district court, applying the Frye test, 7 found petitioners' proffered evidence to be inadmissible and granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment.' 8 Although a vast amount
of epidemiological 9 data was available regarding Bendectin, the

8. 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
9. Id. at 2796. The Court derived this "relevancy" approach from the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 2795. The Court relied primarily on FED. R. EVID. 702.
113 S. Ct. at 2795. The Court also based its ruling on FED. R. EvID. 402, which
generally requires admission of relevant evidence; FED. R. EVID. 401, which defines
relevant evidence as that which has any tendency to make the existence of any
fact in issue more or less probable than it would be otherwise; and FED. R. EvM.
403, which balances relevance against potential unfair prejudice, confusion, and
delay. 113 S. Ct. at 2793-94, 2798.
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
11. Id.; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 57i
(S.D. Cal, 1989). According to the petitioners, these limb-reduction birth defects
were severe and permanent. Petitioner's Brief, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), available in LEXIS, Grenfed Library, Briefs
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
12. 113 S. Ct. at 2791. Bendectin was withdrawn from the market in 1983.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
13. 113 S. Ct. at 2791; 727 F. Supp. at 571.
14. The suit began in California state court but was removed to federal court
on diversity grounds. 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
15. Id.

16. 727 F. Supp. at 571, 573.
17. Id. at 572. Although the district court did not cite Frye, the test it applied
was the Frye test. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 11, at 12.
18. 727 F. Supp. at 571, 576.
19. Epidemiology is a science which focuses on groups of people, and the
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petitioners' evidence was not based on such data but instead was
based on animal-cell studies, live-animal studies, chemical-structure
studies, and recalculations of epidemiological data from previous
studies that had found no link between Bendectin and birth defects. 20
The court held that these types of evidence did not meet the standard
of general acceptance because they were not epidemiological in nature 2l
or because, in the case of the recalculations of epidemiological22
studies, they had not been published or subjected to peer review.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, like the district court, used the Frye test as the standard
for admissibility. 23 The Ninth Circuit noted that four sister circuits
had already ruled on cases in which Bendectin was the alleged cause
of limb-reduction birth defects. 24 Three of those circuits had ruled
that the plaintiffs could not establish causation without criticallyanalyzed epidemiological studies .25 The Ninth Circuit, in accord with
those three circuits, held that the reanalyses of epidemiological stuides
could not be generally accepted in the scientific community without
scrutiny and verification by others in that scientific field and that
occurrence of illness. Nancy A. Dreyer, An Epidemiologic View of Causation: How
it Differs From the Legal, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 40, 40 (1994). Typically, epidemiologic
information is gathered by studying existing information about human groups and
drawing inferences. Id. For example, a group of people living near a nuclear plant
may be compared with people living further away, to infer facts about residential
exposure. Id. Epidemiologists do not include animals in their studies. Id. Some
courts in toxic torts cases have been skeptical of experts who have based their
opinion of causation of injury to humans upon animal or other non-epidemiological
data. Eric W. Wiechmann, Standard of Proof for Increased Risk of Disease or
Injury, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 59, 62 (1994).

20. 727 F. Supp. at 574-76. In the "animal-cell studies," animal cells exposed
to Bendectin were scrutinized by miscroscope to determine whether abnormal cell
development resulted. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 11, at 4. The "live-animal
studies" compared the offspring of animals subjected to Bendectin during gestation
with unexposed offspring. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 11, at 4. The "chemical
structure studies" compared the chemical structure of Bendectin with that of
substances known to cause comparable birth defects. Petitioner's Brief, supra note
11, at 4-5. The "recalculations of epidemiological studies" involved data gathered
from studies comparing the occurrence of various types of birth defects in babies
whose mothers used Bendectin and those who did not. Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 11, at 5.
21. 727 F. Supp. at 575.
22. Id.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th
Cir. 1991).
24. Id. at 1130 (citing Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d
941 (3d Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307
(5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1046 (1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190
(1st Cir. 1987) (opinion by Noonan, J., sitting by designation)).
25. Id. (citing 874 F.2d at 313-15; 857 F.2d at 830; 830 F.2d at 1194).
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the other evidence lacked general acceptance since it was not epidemiological. 26 The court of appeals concluded that the petitioners'
evidence was inadmissible for its failure to satisfy the Frye test and
that, as a result, the petitioners could not prove causation of the
injuries by Bendectin use 27 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary
judgment in favor of Merrell Dow.18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' because of the inconsistency among the circuits on the issue of the standard of admission
for expert testimony.30 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court
agreed with the petitioners' claim that the Frye test had been superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 However, a majority of the Court stated that the displacement of the
Frye "general acceptance" test did not mean that there were no
threshold requirements for purportedly scientific evidence.3 2 Instead
of basing admissibility strictly on general acceptance, the Court
directed trial judges to ensure that offerings of scientific evidence
33
are both relevant and reliable.
The Court cited Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
the focal point of the relevance and reliability requirement 34 and
determined that Rule 702 established a flexible inquiry as to those

26. Id. at 1131 (citing Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HAv. ENVTL. L. REV. 429,
438-39 (1983) (discussing requirements for original epidemiological studies)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
30. 113 S. Ct. at 2792. Compare Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939
F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1280 (1992); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1203 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906
(1986), and United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
that Frye test was not superseded by Federal Rules), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817
(1987) with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d
Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); and United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th
Cir. 1975) (rejecting general acceptance test), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
See also United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) (incorporating
general acceptance as part of a three-prong test), reh'g granted, vacated, 925 F.2d
1127 (8th Cir. 1991).
31. 113 S.Ct. at 2793.
32. Id. at 2794-95.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2795. FED. R. Evm. 702, Testimony by Experts, states, "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise."
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requirements'- Rather than delineating a detailed test for relevance
and reliability, the Court acknowledged that a variety of approaches
already proposed by lower courts and commentators may have merit
to the extent that they focus on the scientific validity of underlying
principles and methodology rather than on the conclusions they
36
generate.
III.

A.

BACKGROUND

Historical Development of Evidentiary Rules

The law of evidence exists largely because lawyers and judges
mistrust juries. 7 Evidentiary rules began to develop concurrently
with the formation of the modern jury system.38 The prevailing view
was that the same evidence which might be safely evaluated by a
39
judge could be dangerous in the hands of ordinary lay jurors.
Jurors, unfamiliar with the law, were apt to be easily swayed or
misled by appeals to their sympathies, passions, or prejudices. 4° In
addition, jurors confronted with specialists or "experts" might tend
to give undue deference to their opinions. The development of the
evidentiary rules regarding opinion testimony and expert testimony
reflects that reasoning.
Longstanding legal tradition held that lay witnesses were allowed
to testify as to facts perceived and could not give their opinions.4'
This was the rule under the common law, and it is generally the
42
same under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

35. 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
36. Id. at 2797 n.12 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39
(3d Cir. 1985); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE
702[03], at 702-41 to 702-42 (1988); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12
(1982); Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 231
(1983) (statement by Margaret A. Berger)).
37. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 1 (2d ed. 1993). For example, the rules limiting
admission of character evidence assume that juries place too much value on such
evidence or use it to punish persons with character traits they find offensive. Id.
38. ROBERT L. DONIGAN ET AL., THE EVIDENCE HANDBOOK §§ 1-2, (Robert H.
Reeder ed., 4th ed. 1980).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. MUELLER &

KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 683.
42. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 683. A lay witness may give
opinion testimony only when there is first-hand knowledge or observation and
where such opinion is helpful in resolving the issues. FED. R. EvD. 701.
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Three factors contributed to this traditional view. 43 The first
was a misreading of old English precedents that condemned opinion
testimony by witnesses who had no first-hand knowledge." These
precedents were misread by American courts as rejecting opinion
testimony even where the witness had first-hand knowledge. 45 The
second reason was that, when it became acceptable for experts (those
with training in science) to state their opinions analyzing and
interpreting underlying data in order to help lay jurors understand
complex issues, lay opinions were thought to be inappropriate because
lay witnesses lacked that scientific training.4 The third factor was
a firm conviction that triers of fact should draw their own conclusions
from lay testimony, and allowing lay witnesses to give opinions
4
would be an intrusion into the fact finder's domain.
Early courts were especially sensitive to the issue of witnesses
invading the province of the jury." Common-law tradition proscribed
not only lay witnesses but even experts from testifying as to the
ultimate issues in the particular case. 49 This "ultimate issue" preclusion
of opinion testimony expressed a fear that opinions could influence
the jury to abandon its duty to weigh the evidence and determine
facts on its own.50 There was a concern that the jury needed to be
protected from situations where opinions given by witnesses might
be adopted without critical analysis.5 Similarly, the Frye test is a
rule which limits admissibility of expert testimony.
B.

The Frye Case and Its Early Acceptance

Because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,
scientific or expert testimony presents the potential hazard of unduly
prejudicing or confusing the issues or misleading juries. 2 Many courts
have applied special rules of admissibility when the evidence is offered
by scientific experts. 53 The Frye case, decided in 1923, was the basis

43.
44.
45.
46.

& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 683.
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 683.
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 683.
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 683-84.
47.
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 684.
48.
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 701.
49.
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 701. The "ultimate issue"
prohibition under the common law was discarded with the adoption of the Federal
Rules. FED. R. Evm. 704.
50. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 701.
51. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 701.
52. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 362 (4th ed. 1992).
MUELLER
MUELLER
MUELLER
MUELLER
MUELLER
MUELLER
MUELLER
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for the most common of these special rules, often referred to as
'5 4
the "Frye test" or the "general acceptance test."
Frye was a murder case in which the trial court declined to
admit a systolic blood pressure deception test." The test had been
administered to the defendant, and defense counsel had offered to
call an expert witness to testify about the results obtained. 6 The
defense also offered to have the expert witness conduct the test in
7
the presence of the jury, but the court refused both offers.
The court, without a single citation to another source in its
opinion, created the now familiar threshold test that had to be met
before scientific evidence could be admitted: the proponent was
required to show that the evidence was derived from principles or
techniques which were generally accepted in the appropriate scientific
community.' The Frye court constructed this rule without explanation
or precedent in its two page opinion. 9 Applying this rule, the court
concluded that the systolic blood pressure deception test had not
yet received sufficient Standing in the physiological or psychological
communities to be admissible. 60 Frye's murder conviction was
affirmed .61
The Frye standard was subsequently adopted by many courts
with little discussion. 62 For judges, the Frye test's virtue was that
it required no technical or scientific expertise, since all they had to

54. Id.
55. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The systolic
blood pressure deception test was a crude precursor to the modern polygraph liedetector test. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793
(1993). The test purportedly would have indicated a rise in blood pressure if the
subject were not telling the truth. 293 F. at 1014.
56. 293 F. at 1014.
57. Id.
58. Id.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
59. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 362.
60. 293 F. at 1014.
61. Id. Frye received a life sentence, but was later pardoned when someone
else confessed to the killing. William Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the
Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711, 715 (1953).
62. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 363.
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do was determine whether the evidence was of a type generally
accepted in the scientific community. 63
Since the widespread adoption of the Frye test, a broad range
of scientific evidence has been excluded from the courtroom for
6
64
failure to demonstrate general acceptance, including polygraph tests,
hypnotically refreshed evidence,66 spectrographs ("voiceprints"), 6 and
evidence of "compulsive gambling disorder" as a defense to nongambling offenses.

68

Under the Frye test, the proponent of evidence must prove
general acceptance by such means as surveys of scientific publication,
judicial decisions, practical applications, or testimony of scientists
as to the opinions held by their fellow scientists. 69 Through 1975,
the general acceptance test was pervasive in federal courts; 70 in
addition, the test has been the standard used in a majority of states.'
More recently, the Frye test was supported by the Bush
administration.7 2 The President's Council on Competitiveness, chaired
by former Vice-President Dan Quayle, advocated that all American
courts adopt the Frye rule, and former President Bush issued an

63. David 0. Stewart, A New Test: Decision Creates Uncertain Future for
Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 79 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 48.
64. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 363; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus
Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 577, 577-78 (1984)
(citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); State v. Boyington,
379 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)).
65. People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 358-59 (Colo. 1981); People v. Baynes,
430 N.E.2d 1070, 1076-79 (Ill. 1981); People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d 269, 281 (Mich.
1955).
66. People v. Gonzales, 310 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd,
385 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1986); Polk v. State, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1981).
67. Cornett v. State, 450 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ind. 1983); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d
364, 377 ',Md 10788)
68. United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 999 (7th Cir. 1986) (excluding

evidence that the alleged compulsive gambling disorder was sufficiently related to
nongambling offenses to be the basis for an insanity defense); United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987) (ruling
that the failure to pay taxes could not be tied to pathological gambling).
69. STRONG, supra rote 53, § 203, at 363.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("This case [Frye]
has been followed uniformly in this and other Circuits and there has never been
any successful challenge to it in any federal court.").
71. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

§ 1-5, at 9 (2d ed. 1993). By the late 1970's the Frye test was the standard used
by forty-five states. Imwinkelried, supra note 64, at 577.
72. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Abolish the Frye Test, CALIFORNiA LAWYER, Apr.
12, 1992, at 63.
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executive order requiring federal litigators to limit the evidence they
submitted to that which qualified under the Frye rule."
Conservative theorist Peter Huber asserted that the United States
economy has been put at a disadvantage by the recent move away
from the Frye rule. 74 Huber argued that this has resulted in the
introduction of "junk science" as evidence against U.S. corporations
in product liability and toxic tort lawsuits.7 Huber suggested that
this junk science has led juries to wrongfully find corporations liable,
76
thus forcing American industry to absorb unnecessary costs.
Frye rule supporters assume that lay jurors are not competent
to evaluate scientific proof and that many will overestimate the
probative value of scientific evidence. 77 The Frye general acceptance
rule is credited by its proponents for protecting against juries that
would treat novel scientific evidence as infallible, promoting uniformity
in evidentiary rulings, avoiding time-consuming hearings on the validity
of novel techniques, and shielding the legal system from new types
of evidence until a larger pool of experts is available to evaluate
s
it.7 However, most commentators agree that these objectives can
be achieved with a less drastic limitation on admissibility. 79
C.

The Move Away From Frye and Toward a Relevancy
Standard

In the last twenty years, the Frye rule has come under attack;
it has been criticized, limited, modified, and rejected in various
jurisdictions.80 A number of jurisdictions have abandoned it altogether,
especially since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975.1

73. Id.
74. Id. (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991)).

75. Id.
76. Id. But see Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1670-75 (1993) (criticizing GALILEO'S REVENGE
and its treatment of Bendectin claims).
77. Imwinkelried, supra note 64, at 580.
78. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 363; GIANNELLi & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 71, § 1-5(A), at 13; Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197,
1207 (1980).
79. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 363.
80. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 363.
81. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir.
1985); United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1104 (1987).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in federal court in both

criminal and civil cases, regardless of whether federal or state law
supplies the rule of decision. 2 In addition, most states have adopted
codes modeled after the Federal Rules."3 In states that have not
adopted the Federal Rules, the state courts cite them and sometimes
adopt their principles.8
,
One criticism of the Frye test is that it excludes potentially
useful evidence until enough time has passed for a consensus to
develop among the scientific community.8 5 Some critics say this makes
the test too conservative, while others consider this conservative
6
feature an advantage.
Although the Frye test appears certain on its face, in that all
the trial judge must know is whether the evidence is accepted in
the scientific community, in application the test is much more
ambiguous. The application of the Frye test involves two steps.87
First, the court must identify which scientific field relates most closely
to the evidence offered, and, second, the court must determine
whether the scientific principle underlying the evidence has been
generally accepted by members of that field.88 One problem often
encountered with identifying the appropriate scientific field is that
many scientific techniques involve more than one discipline. 9 The
Frye test gives no guidance as to which experts should be counted,
nor does it explain whether "general acceptance" means virtually
everyone counted, a majority, or perhaps only a substantial number.9
82. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 3. However, in diversity cases
where federal courts must apply state substantive law, the Federal Rules call for
application of state evidence rules in certain areas, such as presumptions, competency
of witnesses, and privileges. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 3; FED.
R. Evm. 301, 501, 601.
83. MUELLER & KiRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 3. By 1992, the following 34
states had adopted rules based on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, H.awaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Washington, and Wyoming. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 3 n.2.
84. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, at 3.
85. Giannelli, supra note 78, at 1223. A literal interpretation of Frye v. United
States requires courts to always wait for a "cultural lag" period to pass, during
which the new method filters through the scientific community and gathers enough
momentum for the required level of acceptance. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 71, § 1-5(E), at 21.
86. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, § 1-5(E), at 21-22.
87. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, § 1-5(B), at 14.
88. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, § 1-5(B), at 14.
89. Giannelli, supra note 78, at 1208. For example, the study of speech may
involve anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology, and linguistics. Giannelli, supra
note 78, at 1208.
90. Giannelli, supra note 78, at 1210.
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Because both steps are troublesome, 9' commentators have criticized
the test as vague and unenlightening. 9
While the merits of the Frye test have always been extensively
debated, the debate over its validity intensified in 1975 after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Critics and commentators
were divided over whether the Federal Rules of Evidence had
superseded the Frye test. 93 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held as early as 1978 that the Frye test was not
adequate as a threshold test and styled its test instead on probativeness,
materiality, reliability, and tendency to prejudice the jury, an obvious
reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 94 In a later decision, the
Second Circuit determined that the test for admission of novel
scientific evidence was "whether the testimony will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 95
The court adopted this rule from Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
which allows experts to give opinion testimony as to scientific
knowledge if it assists the fact finder. 96 The Second Circuit held
that, for evidence to be helpful to the fact finder, it must be relevant
97
and reliable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
the Frye test in 1985 for policy reasons. 9 The court did not hold
that the Federal Rules of Evidence overruled Frye,99 but it determined
that the Frye test suffered from serious flaws.'00 The Third Circuit
observed that the general acceptance test was too malleable to provide
the order and uniformity that its proponents sought.' 0 ' The Third
Circuit declared that, because of its vagueness, the Frye test had
been manipulated by courts in making determinations about which
scientific field had accepted the technique and about what level of
acceptance constitutes "general acceptance." ' 102 The Third Circuit
held that the Frye test was so conservative that it conflicted with
91. Giannelli, supra note 78, at 1208. Selection of the scientific field may be
unclear because of overlapping or the availability of subspecialties. Moreover, the
choice of fields may be dispositive. Giannelli, supra note 78, at 1208.
92. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, § 1-5(B), at 14.
93. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, § 1-5(F), at 22.
94. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
95. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985).
99. Id.

100. Id. at 1237.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1236.
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the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence,0 3 which take a liberal
view toward the admission of expert testimony. 1° The Third Circuit
concluded that the general acceptance test was not a necessary
precondition for admissibility; general acceptance was merely one
factor trial courts should consider. 0 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
adopted an admission standard even more conservative than Frye
in a case involving deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.1°6 The court
adopted a three-prong test which required general acceptance of the
underlying theory, general acceptance of the procedures for
implementing the theory, and adherence to the procedures by the
testing laboratory. 10 7 The court concluded that Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 did not supersede the Frye test because the two rules
were compatible and not mutually exclusive.0m
In addition to these decisions, a number of alternative approaches
to the general acceptance test have been proposed. One proposal
by Professor McCormick would treat scientific evidence the same
as other evidence.' °9 This approach would be consistent with the
Federal Rules of Evidence and would employ a three part analysis:
ascertaining the probative value of the evidence, identifying
countervailing dangers, and balancing the results of the first two
steps." 0
Other possible standards for admission include: substantial
acceptance by the scientific community, direct analysis of reliability
or validity by the court without consideration of acceptance, automatic
admission coupled with court-appointed expert testimony if the court
deems it necessary, screening of new developments by panels of
scientists rather than by the courts, and the "traditional" standards
of relevancy and necessary expertise."'
State courts, like their federal counterparts, have been divided
between those adhering to the Frye test and those adopting the
relevancy approach. in 1989, twenty-eight states and the District of
Columbia utilized the Frye test, seventeen states used some form of

103. Id. at 1237.
104. Id. at 1226.

105. Id.at 1237.
106. United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted,
vacated, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991).

107. Id.
108. Id. at 60 n.7.
109. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71,
110. GANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71,
111. STRONG, supra note 53, § 203, at 363-64.

§ 1-6, at 26.
§ 1-6, at 27.
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the relevancy approach, and the remaining five states used a
2
combination of the two or were unclear as to the standard."1
IV.

REASONING OF THE COURT

In Daubert, the Supreme Court acknowledged the debate over
the merits of the Frye test, but ultimately based its decision on its
determination that the test was superseded by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which became effective in 1975. 113 The Court began its
analysis with Rule 402, which provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible unless an exception is made by the Constitution, Acts of
Congress, Supreme Court Rules pursuant to statutory authority, or
elsewhere in the Rules of Evidence.' '4 The Court interpreted Rules
401 and 402 as creating a liberal standard for relevance."'
The Court then turned to Rule 702 which more specifically
addresses the issue." 6 Rule 702 allows the admission of scientific
evidence if it helps the fact7 finder understand the evidence or determine facts in question."
The Court ruled that nothing in the text of Rule 702 made
general acceptance by the scientific community an absolute prerequisite to admissibility and that Merrell Dow had failed to show that
the Rules were intended to incorporate a general acceptance standard." 8 In so ruling, the Court noted that there was no mention
whatsoever of Frye in the drafting history of the Federal Rules." 9
As a result, the Court held that the liberal thrust of the Rules and
the specific coverage of expert scientific testimony by Rule 702 with
no reference to general acceptance were at odds with the austere
Frye ruling. 20 The Court unanimously concluded that the Frye rule
2
should no longer be applied in federal courts.' '

112. For a complete chart of the states and the federal courts of appeals and
which methodology is used in each, see Hanson, supra note 3, at 372-87.
113. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993).
114. Id. Rule 401 defines "relevant evidence" as that tending to make a consequential fact more or less probable than it would otherwise be. Id. at 2794.
115. Id. at 2794.
116. Id. Rule 702 requires the expert to testify only as to scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge. FED. R. EvID. 702. The Court limited its opinion
to the scientific context since that was the only type involved in the case. 113
S. Ct. at 2795 n.8. The Court noted that scientific knowledge must be derived by
the scientific method, which in turn demands a standard of evidentiary reliability.
Id. at 2795.
117. 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 2794.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After disposing of the Frye test, the Court cautioned that limits
22
remained as to the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence.
The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence place a duty
upon trial judges to ensure that23 all scientific testimony or other
evidence is relevant and reliable.
The Court interpreted Rule 702 as restricting an expert to tes24
timony of only scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.
The Court limited its holding, however, to the scientific context
since that was the only type involved in the immediate case. 25 The
Court reasoned that "scientific knowledge" must be derived by the
scientific method, which in turn demands a standard of evidentiary
reliability. 26 The Court explained that its use of the phrase "evidentiary reliability" meant "trustworthiness."' 1 27 That standard requires that proffered testimony be supported by "appropriate
1 28
validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known.'
The Court reasoned that the text of Rule 702 calls for relevance
because it requires that the evidence "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' ' 2 9 The
Court stated that one aspect of relevance is whether the evidence
is sufficiently related to the facts of the case to aid the jury. 30 The
Court ruled that "fit" was an apt description of the relevance
but that "fit" is not always apparent and that
consideration,'
does not necessarily
scientific validity for one particular purpose
32
purposes.
other
for
validity
scientific
mean
The Court further held that, when expert scientific evidence is
offered, Federal Rule 104(a) 33 requires that the trial judge make a
preliminary assessment of the existence of relevance and reliability., 4

122. Id. at 2794-95.
123. Id. at 2795.
1'%A

I.a

125. Id. at 2795 n.8.
126. Id. at 2795.
127. Id. at 2795 n.9.
128. Id. at 2795.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2796.
131. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
132. Id. Scientific studies of the phases of the moon, for example, may be
helpful if the issue involved is the amount of moonlight present on a certain night,
but it will not be helpful in determining whether a person behaved peculiarly on
the night in question. Id.
133. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) states: "Preliminary questions concerning the . ..
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions
of subdivision (b) [concerning relevancy conditioned on fact]." Id.
134. 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
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The trial judge must determine whether the reasoning and methods
used as the basis for the evidence are scientifically valid and applicable
to facts in issue.' The Court expressed confidence that federal
judges were capable of making this assessment, but it did not
promulgate a definitive checklist or test for judges to use in their
preliminary assessments.' 3 6 The Court did, however, make some
general observations relating to relevance and reliability, discussing
37
four factors for trial judges to consider.'
The first factor the Court noted was whether the theory or
technique had the potential to be tested and whether it had actually
been tested. 3 8 A second factor the Court found significant, but not
dispositive, was whether the theory or technique had been subjected
to peer review and publication. "9 The Court reasoned that scrutiny
by the scientific community is beneficial in exposing flaws in methodology. 4 The Court observed that the known or potential rate of
error of a particular scientific technique should also be considered,
as well as whether standards for controlling the technique's operation
are maintained. '4' Finally, though disposing of the Frye test. as the
determinative rule, the Court instructed that general acceptance can
still be an important part of the analysis. 42 An assessment of reliability permits, but does not require, an express determination of
43
the degree of acceptance within a particular scientific community.'
The Court warned trial court judges to be mindful of other
Federal Rules that apply when making an assessment of expert
scientific testimony.'" The Court noted that Rule 703 limits the use
of expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay to instances where the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts of the field.1 45 The Court also noted that Rule 706 gives

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2797. The Court stated that publication, as a form of peer review,
does not necessarily make the subject matter reliable, but it does increase the
likelihood that substantive errors in methodology will be detected. Id. The Court
also observed that it is possible for a scientific theory to be well-grounded without
publication, when, for example, the subject is very new or of such limited interest
as to not qualify for publication. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the trial court discretion to select an expert of its own choosing.' 4
The Court then cited Rule 403, which allows the court to exclude
even relevant evidence when its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, the damage that would result from
confusion of the issues, or the likelihood that the evidence will be
47
misleading to the jury.'
The Supreme Court addressed the argument by Merrell Dow
that abandonment of the general acceptance test would open the
floodgates of junk science upon overwhelmed juries. 4 The Court
stated that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.' ' 49 In addition, the Court pointed out that the trial court
has at its disposal the power to issue a directed verdict or summary
judgment as a safety valve for disposing of evidentiary problems. 50
The Court acknowledged that the gate-keeping role of trial judges
envisioned here would occasionally prevent the presentation of innovative and authentic insights to a jury, but stated that the Rules
of Evidence strike a balance aimed at the quick and final resolution
of legal disputes rather than toward an "exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding."' 5 '
The Court vacated and remanded the case and summarized its
holding by stating that general acceptance is not a necessary precondition for admission, and that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, trial judges must ensure that an expert's testimony is based
on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the case. 5 2 "Pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those
demands." 15
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, joined the
majority in declaring that the Frye test had been superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, but they dissented as to the general
observations made by the Court which were unnecessary in deciding
the case. 4 The dissenters stated that such observations were too

146. Id. at 2797-98.
147. Id.

148. Id.
149. Id.(citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
150. Id.; see FED. R. CIrv. P. 50(a), 56.
151.
152.
153.
154.

113 S. Ct. at 2798-99.
Id. at 2799.
Id.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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vague and abstract to be beneficial since they were not applied to
determining the admissibility of the particular evidence of the case.'.,
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for "parsing the
language" of Rule 702 to reach its conclusion that reliability is a
prerequisite for admission of scientific evidence and observed that
''countless" questions were raised by the majority's enunciation of
a new standard."16 Chief Justice Rehnquist further expressed concern
that the new relevancy standard obligates trial court judges to become
57
amateur scientists.
V.

SIGNIFICANCE

The full impact of Daubert may not be known for years to
come, but the potential impact is vast as courts apply the test to
a broad range of evidence and reconsider the admissibility of many
types of scientific evidence. 5
Some observers contend that the Daubert analysis will expose
juries to evidence that would previously have been excluded under
the Frye test, 19 while others believe that it will exclude some evidence
which had been generally accepted in the scientific community but
6
which cannot pass muster under the new "scientific validity" test.'1
It is possible that both claims are true,' 6' but it seems unlikely that
many scientific techniques generally accepted in the scientific community will be found to lack scientific validity or that techniques
with minimal acceptance by scientists will be found valid by courts. 62
Although general acceptance is no longer an absolute threshold
requirement, relevance and reliability are. It would appear that the
most significant change made by Daubert is that the burden for
determining admission has shifted from the scientific community to
the federal trial judge. The courts must now look beyond the acceptance of the scientific community into the scientific nature and

155. Id.

156. Id. at 2800.
157. Id.

158. Stewart, supra note 63, at 50-51.
159. Stewart, supra note 63, at 50. Professor Michael H. Gottesman of the
Georgetown University Law Center, who argued the Daubert case for the plaintiffs,
predicts that the ruling will make admission easier in the circuits that previously
used the Frye test. Stewart, supra note 63, at 51. Gottesman said that part of the
reason is that most scientists are employed by industry and are not inclined to
agree with plaintiffs' arguments that novel scientific approaches are generally accepted. Stewart, supra note 63, at 51.
160. Stewart, supra note 63, at 50.
161. Stewart, supra note 63, at 50.
162. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
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validity 63 of the techniques underlying the proffered evidence. Although this may seem to effect a radical change in judicial process,
64
it will not have a significant impact on the outcome of most trials'
because trial judges will still look to the scientific community to
evaluate the validity, and thus the reliability, of scientific evidence.65
Many federal judges believe Daubert makes their job more
difficult.'"1 Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried has predicted that "[iut
is going to be hard for lay judges to come to grips with where we
are.' ' 67 Professor Imwinkelried approves of Daubert and suggests
that one reason the Frye test lasted so long was its relative convenience for the judiciary.'" Imwinkelried remarked that judges and
lawyers alike were comfortable with the Frye test because it relieved
them of the burden of determining the reliability of scientific evidence. 69
Some parts of the Daubert decision appear to leave unanswered
questions, such as whether or not the general observations made by
the majority apply to proffered evidence which is characterized as
"technical or other specialized knowledge" rather than "scientific."' 70
This question arises because Rule 702 makes no distinction between
these types of expert testimony, while the majority opinion limits
7
itself to the "scientific" expert category.
Soon after the Daubert decision, some observers felt that the
ruling would be applied only to the type of evidence previously
subject to the Frye test. 7 2 However, federal decisions are applying
the Daubertrule broadly thus far, not only to novel scientific evidence
previously subjected to the Frye test, but to all types of expert

163. Scientific validity is the basis for evidentiary reliability under the Daubert
approach. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795
n.9 (1993).
164. 753 F.2d at 1238.
The scienific
t.
coimunity is the most quaiicu authority to assess sLiciLic

validity. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
166. Rorie Sherman, Judges Learning Daubert: "Junk Science" Rule Used Broadly,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 28. Federal Senior District Judge Jack B. Weinstein
of the Eastern District of New York, a widely recognized expert of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, said that judges will have to give a more reasoned statement
about why evidence is admitted and can no longer rubber-stamp their admissions
based on general acceptance. Id.
167. Stewart, supra note 63, at 51.
168. Stewart, supra note 63, at 51.
169. Stewart, supra note 63, at 51.

170. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2800 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Id. at 2795 n.8.

172. Sherman, supra note 166, at 3.
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testimony, including that which is not considered "scientific.'
Already the federal courts have applied the Daubert analysis to an
76
accidentologist, 174 accountants,175 an economist,1 and a physician. 177
Commentators have suggested that there is now a need for
scientific education seminars for judges, to prepare them for their
more active role in determining whether evidence is based on solid
scientific methodology. 7 8 A campaign has begun to educate judges
in their role under the Daubert analysis. 7 9 A training- program for
judges has been prepared by the Carnegie Commission on Science,
Technology, and Government, along with the Federal Judicial Center
and the advisory committee for federal judges in the Eastern District
of New York.'10 A pilot program was tested in September of 1993,
and topics discussed under the Daubert analysis included the use of
computer-generated evidence, DNA evidence, issues of causation in
toxic tort cases, and case management techniques.' 8'
The Daubert ruling does not directly affect state courts. 8 2 State
courts remain free to use the Frye test, the relevancy approach, or
whatever approach they desire. The widespread adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence by the states places them in basically the
same posture as the federal courts in viewing the Frye-relevance
dichotomy. For this reason, state court judges may feel the need
to familiarize themselves with the Daubert analysis because of the
83
sense of direction it gives.
Of course, some states have already chosen the relevancy approach. For example, in 1991, the Arkansas Supreme Court reached
the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in Daubert when it rejected
the Frye test in favor of a relevancy approach.'8 4 The Arkansas

173. Sherman, supra note 166, at 3.
174. Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp.
677, 682-83 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
175. Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993).
176. Doe v. Tag, Inc., No. 92 C 7661, 1993 WL 484212, at *3 (N.D. Il1. Nov.
18, 1993).
177. O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105-06 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2711 (1994).
178. Stewart, supra note 63, at 51 (comments of Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried).
179. Sherman, supra note 166, at 3.
180. Sherman, supra note 166, at 28.
181. Sherman, supra note 166, at 28.
182. Sherman, supra note 166, at 28.
183. Sherman, supra note 166, at 28 (Remarks of Dennis Catlin, Director, The
Michigan Judicial Institute).
184. Prater v. Arkansas, 307 Ark. 180, 185, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (1991). The
Prater court considered three factors to be important in the determination of
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approach requires trial judges to conduct a preliminary inquiry
focused on reliability, the possibility that the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead jurors, and relevance to factual issues
in the particular case.""3 Subsequent to the Daubert decision, the
86
Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it had no criticism of Daubert.
While federal courts that previously employed the Frye test are
adjusting to the Daubert approach with perhaps some trepidation
and a sense of carrying a heavier burden of assessing admissibility,
there are advantages to the new approach. First, there will be
uniformity; the Frye test is gone and all federal courts must use
the relevancy-reliability analysis. Second, the Daubert approach gives
judges increased flexibility. A trial court may admit evidence even
where there has been a lack of support for the underlying technique
in the scientific community, or, conversely, a judge may exclude
evidence based on generally accepted science if a lack of validity
or relevance is found.
Finally, in conjunction with flexibility, the autonomy of the
judiciary is maintained under the Daubert approach. In contrast to
the Frye test, judges will not be forced to delegate important legal
decisions to scientists. This is important because the scientific acceptance of any particular technique is not motivated by the same
sense of urgency as is the need for courts to reach final and binding
legal judgments.'8
Ed Koon

reliability: (I) the frequency of erroneous results l5roduced by a novel scientific
technique, (2) the type of error which could occur, and (3) proof of the use of
the correct protocol during the testing process. Id. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 432.
Arkansas adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence as promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which were in turn modeled
after the Federal Rules. 13A U.L.A. 1, 5; Act of Feb. 10, 1976, No. 1143, § 1,
1975 Ark. Acts 2799, 2799 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)).
The Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence became effective July 1, 1976. Act of
Feb. 10, 1976, No. 1143, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 2799, 2849 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 1994)).
The applicability of the Frye test in Arkansas was unclear prior to the Prater
decision. In Rock v. Arkansas, 288 Ark. 566, 570, 708 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1986),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Arkansas Supreme
Court avoided choosing between the Frye test and "traditional evidentiary concepts."
The Arkansas Supreme Court excluded hypnotically-refreshed testimony, concluding
that it would be inadmissible under either standard. Id.
185. 307 Ark. at 186, 820 S.W.2d at 431.
186. Jones v. Arkansas, 314 Ark. 289, 294, 862 S.W.2d 242, 245 (1993).
187. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).

